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It is alleged by some that there is a crisis in the foundations of mathematics. There are too many prop-ositions in various branches of mathematics which have been shown to be independent of the more widely ac-cepted axioms of set theory. What is needed is for mathematicians to get together and decide once and for all (or at least until the next crisis) which axioms are to comprise set theory and, by doing so, decide what is to be the subject matter of mathematics, i.e., the theory of the chosen axioms. In jumping one way or the other on the axiom of constructibility, the axiom of choice, the continuum hypothesis, Martin's axiom, etc., the propositions referred to above would no longer be independent. A decision on these axioms would determine these statements or their negations as derivable from set theory, and all would be well again (for the time being) with mathematics. Of course, the first response is 'OK, what axioms do you want?' and thereupon begins the whole dispute again—one math-ematician wants the continuum hypothesis, another doesn't, and so on. 
I think, however, that this allegation and the 
proposed solution betray a false understanding of 
mathematics as a monolithic structure built on a single 
foundation of logic and set theory. Mathematics is 
said then to consist formally of those theorems deriva-
ble from such a single foundation. Or the subject mat-
ter of mathematics is said to be fundamentally the 
properties of sets as uniquely described by set theory. 
The vista of many crystal palaces, each one built on 
its own peculiar foundation, is viewed with distaste, 
especially when some of these towers are unable to 
decide whether various structures can be incorporated. 
The purpose of set theory, it is said, is to 
provide a single, solid foundation for the whole of 
mathematics by giving as precise as possible a charac-
terization of the notion of set. It should, as it 
were, determine as far as possible the architectural 
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possibilities of the crystal palace of mathematics. No 
reasonable proposition should be left loitering on the 
doorstep; it should be admitted or sent away. And if 
the doorkeeper set theory can't decide, he should be 
given the criteria to decide: another axiom. But if 
this is what is required of set theory, the 
inevitability would be many crystal palaces anyway, 
each fawned over by its own admirers. That is, 
mathematics would still be fragmented and the only 
thing new would be the dispute among mathematicians as 
to who really are the mathematicians. 
I think this is a false view of mathematics. The 
actual landscape of practicing mathematicians seems to 
be a veritable suburban development of crystal palaces. 
As practiced, mathematics consists not of a monolithic 
structure built upon a single logic and set theory, but 
rather upon many set theories and, for that matter, 
many logics. The attitude I would engender is the ac-
ceptance of what is the present practice and to see it 
all as mathematics proper. 1 would like to charac-
terize mathematics so that the din of the crisis-
mongers is reduced, so that the different versions of 
set theory and logic are all seen as part of the same 
subject matter—mathematics. I think that if math-
ematics is properly characterized, then the alleged 
crisis would be seen as no crisis at all; there would 
be no more crisis in set theory than there is in, say, 
group theory. 
The following sketchy characterization seems to me 
to be obvious. Mathematics consists of the description 
of kinds of things by way of basic propositions called 
axioms or postulates and of the subsequent deduction of 
derived properties of these kinds defined by the 
axioms. Let me move right to an example, for I think 
the prima facie obviousness of this view arises out of 
a consideration of many examples of the practices of 
mathematicians doing mathematics. A group theorist 
says that a group is set with a two-place operation 
defined on the set such that the operation is 
associative, that the group has an identity with 
respect to the operation, and that each element of the 
group has an inverse with respect to that operation. 
Having done this, the group theorist proceeds to give 
examples of groups: the integers with addition, the 
rationals with multiplication, etc. He then shows cer-
tain derived properties of groups (e.g., the uniqueness 
of identities and inverses). He defines properties of 
groups (finite, cyclic, abelian) and shows, by way of 
example, that some groups have these properties and 
some do not. He defines other kinds of things that 
have to do with groups such as subgroups, homomorphism, 
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and centers; and he discusses properties and kinds of these. 
I suggest that the mathematics of group theory is 
precisely as it is described above as the practice of a 
group theorist. I don't mean to suggest, by the way, 
that mathematics is just whatever practicing math-
ematicians do—rather, I take this as my starting point 
in my attempt to characterize mathematics in a more en-
lightening way. What a group theorist does is to 
define a kind of thing, a group. This is done by 
presenting the axioms of group theory. The derived 
properties of groups are shown to be properties of 
groups by giving a deduction of them from the axioms. 
If we think of group theory in the way a logician might 
(that is, rendered in the language of first-order 
predicate logic with identity J, then showing examples 
of groups amounts to showing that models of group 
theory exist. In showing that some groups are cyclic 
and others are not, he has distinguished then two kinds 
of groups, in fact, two species of the genus group, 
where the differentia are expressed by the definitions 
of cyclic and acyclic. In the logician's view, he has 
shown that if another axiom is added to the axioms of 
group theory, then one gets another theory (the theory 
of cyclic groups, for example) about another kind of 
object which is a species of group. 
I think that, in general, the same sort of charac-
terization applies to all branches of mathematics. 
Group theorists, ring theorists, topologists, measure 
theorists, and geometers are all engaged in laying down 
a definition of a kind of thing, deriving properties of 
it, demarcating species of it, defining related kinds 
of things and deriving the properties and relations of 
these. And I think it is clear that these other par-
ticular cases can be handled in the same way that I 
have characterized group theory. 
But what has this to do with the foundations of 
mathematics and set theory? After all, all these areas 
of mathematics can be done within set theory. For 
example, a group is an ordered pair with a set as first 
coordinate and an operation as second coordinate. And 
an operation is just a set of ordered triples with cer-
tain properties specifiable in set theory. Thus, group 
theory is merely a part of set theory. One can admit 
the above characterization of mathematics and still be 
concerned with set theory and the foundations of 
mathematics. And this concern can spread to group 
theory since the question of whether certain groups 
have certain properties or whether certain kinds of 
groups exist depends on which set theory one chooses. 
The set-theoretical rendering of group theory does 
indeed give the appearance that group theory is merely 
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part of set theory. And this gives the appearance that 
set theory is more fundamental than group theory and 
any other mathematical theory that can be developed in 
set theory. Whether this is the correct view of the 
matter (and I will argue later that it isn't), I think 
nonetheless that the group theory example is instruc-
tive since the characterization given for it might en-
counter less resistance. For example, a Platonist 
might agree with my characterization while still being 
puzzled about which set theory is the correct one. Yet 
I would characterize set theory in more or less the 
same way as I have group theory. There is a genus, 
universe rof sets, defined by the collection of, say, 
the 'noncontroversial* axioms of set theory (if there 
be such). The set theorist derives properties of sets 
from the given axioms, defines certain kinds of sets, 
properties, relations, etc., and proves various prop-
ositions about them. 
Now under this genus, universe of sets, there are 
many species of universes, each one differentiated by 
the various 'controversial' axioms. In other words, 
all the various set theories merely delineate different 
species of one genus. For one species of universe the 
axiom of choice is true and for another it is false, 
and similarly for the other axioms. The question of 
whether the axiom of choice is true in some less 
qualified sense is, then, just like the question in 
group theory whether the abelian 'axiom' is true (i.e., 
whether all groups are abelian). The question then ap-
pears to be phrased incorrectly. The point is not 
whether the abelian 'axiom' is true, rather, some kinds 
of objects which satisfy the group postulates also 
satisfy the abelian 'axiom' and some do not. If one 
adds the abelian 'axiom' to group theory one gets the 
theory of abelian groups. And so it is in set theory, 
except for a lack of vocabulary. The point is not 
whether the axiom of choice is true, rather, some kinds 
of objects which satisfy the other axioms of set theory 
also satisfy the axiom of choice and some do not. And 
yet, group theorists lose no sleep over the abelian 
•axiom'. There are many propositions which are in-
dependent of and consistent with the axioms of group 
theory. The existence of both abelian and nonabelian 
groups shows the independence and consistency of the 
abelian 'axiom1. But there is no crisis alleged in the 
foundations of group theory; and I claim that there is, 
in just the same way, no crisis in the foundations of 
set theory or mathematics. 
As I mentioned, Platonists might agree with my 
characterization of group theory yet balk at extending 
it to set theory. The thought is that there are 
eternal, mathematical objects 'out there' whose proper-
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ties one studies in mathematics. For example, among 
those objects there is the set of real numbers and it 
is thought that the continuum hypothesis is true of 
this set or it is not. And unfortunately, the other 
axioms of set theory do not decide this question one 
way or the other. Hence, a crisis in the foundations 
of mathematics is announced; or the Platonist claims 
that the problem is that we have an insufficiently 
clear intuition of the mathematical object we are 
trying to describe and thus are unable to incorporate 
all of its features into our axiom system. 
But why must we think that there is the set of real 
numbers of which the continuum hypothesis is true or 
false? Rather, I would suggest that there are various 
kinds of sets of all real numbers, some of which have 
the size the continuum hypothesis asserts that they 
have and some of which are larger. The question is not 
whether the continuum hypothesis is true of the real 
numbers, but which set of all real numbers one is 
talking about in a particular case. And this view is 
compatible with Platonism—among the eternal objects 
'out there1 are many sets which are species of the 
genus set of all real numbers. In the same way that it 
is not quite to the point to ask whether the abelian 
'axiom' is true of groups, even for the Platonist, so 
it is not quite to the point to ask whether the con-
tinuum hypothesis is true of the real numbers. If the 
Platonist can countenance species of groups, then he 
can also accept species of real numbers and, for that 
matter, species of universes of sets. 
It can also be seen now that we don't have to 
retreat to a kind of formalism in which the truth value 
of the continuum hypothesis is of no concern since no 
mathematical statements have a truth value, nor do we 
have to deny the law of excluded middle and say that 
the continuum hypothesis is neither true nor false. In 
fact, if the continuum hypothesis asserts that any ver-
sion of the real numbers has cardinality Mi» then it is 
just false. There are some versions of the set of real 
numbers which assert that the cardinality of the real 
numbers is larger than Mi* 
Thus, there is really no crisis in the foundations 
of mathematics. The independence and relative con-
sistency of the continuum hypothesis and the axiom of 
choice and the others do not create a crisis, rather 
they are interesting mathematical facts. The indepen-
dence and consistency of propositions in various 
branches of mathematics do not indicate that there are 
loose ends in the characterization of the subject mat-
ter of mathematics. They do indicate that of the 
things defined in these branches of mathematics, some 
have the property in question and some do not. 
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Moreover, the proofs of independence and consistency of 
these propositions are themselves bona fide parts of 
mathematical knowledge and inquiry. To insist that set 
theory be so constituted as to decide these prop-
ositions would be to deny a place in the subject matter 
of mathematics to something which very plausibly is a 
part of the subject matter of mathematics even if one 
construes mathematics to be only the theory of sets. 
On the view that the various set theories are 
species of universe of sets, independence and con-
sistency proofs show places where generalizations might 
be sought. What I mean is this: it is usually sug-
gested that in proofs which use, say, the axiom of 
choice, such a use should be noted. Also, where prop-
ositions are proved using the axiom of choice, it is of 
some interest to find alternate proofs of the same 
proposition which do not use this axiom. On my view, 
what is achieved here, when such a proof is found, is 
greater generality. The reason for trying to prove 
propositions without using the axiom of choice is not 
because we don't know whether it is true or false, 
rather it is in order to have more generality. 
Propositions proved without the axiom of choice are 
true both for universes in which the axiom is true and 
for those in which it is false. It is the same 
situation as in group theory in which a proof of a 
proposition that all abelian groups have a certain 
property is generalized to show that all groups, 
abelian and nonabelian, have this property. 
Some of the reasons for wanting a single set theory 
arise out of the logicist view of mathematics, that 
mathematics is part of logic in the sense that all the 
concepts of mathematics (or at least those which are 
developed out of number theory) can be defined by way 
of strictly logical concepts and that the theorems of 
mathematics can be proved from strictly logical prin-
ciples using only rules of inference from logic. 
Whether or not this can be shown, there has been pro-
gress in showing that all or most of mathematics can be 
done on the basis of set theory axioms. Hence, the 
view arises that whether or not set theory is part of 
logic, at least mathematics can be reduced to set 
theory and thus, the subject matter of mathematics (or 
most of it) is just the notion of a universe of sets as 
described by the axioms of set theory. The question of 
which axioms are to be the axioms of set theory then is 
the question of what is the single, unified subject 
matter of mathematics. 
Now one might admit that there is no point to in-
sisting on a single set theory, that there are many 
species of universe of sets, but still claim that the 
result is various species of subject matter of 
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mathematics in the sense that each species consists of 
just what can be shown to hold of the particular 
universe of sets determined by the set-theoretic axioms 
which are used. It is still claimed that the other 
branches of mathematics are just developments of 
whatever species of set theory is being used. Thus, 
group theory, topology, measure theory,number theory, 
etc., are all seen as the study of certain kinds of 
sets whose properties are determined to whatever extent 
is possible by the set theory being used. I claim that 
this is still a mistaken view of mathematics, that 
claims to have reduced mathematics to set theory, or 
even to a collection of species of set theories, do not 
give a correct account of the subject matter of 
mathematics. 
What I want to focus on here are the claims that 
various sorts of mathematical objects can be 'reduced' 
to other, perhaps more fundamental, mathematical ob-
jects. In general, the reductions end up with charac-
terizations of various mathematical objects as sets. 
For example, the study of natural numbers is seen to be 
the study of certain sets of sets. The natural number 
2, for example, is represented by the set of all sets x 
which satisfy the following property: there is an ob-
ject b and an object c such that b€x and c€x, and for 
any z, if z(x, then z=b or z=c. The other natural num-
bers are represented similarly. Zero is represented by 
the empty set and the successor operation is charac-
terized in the usual way. Under this characterization, 
one can show that the Peano axioms for number theory 
are provable from the axioms of set theory. But does 
this show that number theory is really only a part of 
set theory? Are the natural numbers strictly identical 
to the sets of sets characterized above? 
What it does show is that there are objects in the 
domain of set theory which have some of the same struc-
ture as the natural numbers. The additional claim that 
the sets of sets characterized above are the natural 
numbers, though, seems to me rather dubious. After 
all, there are other set-theoretic ways of charac-
terizing the natural numbers. For example, the stan-
dard way is to represent zero as the empty set and the 
successor operation such that if x is a set, then the 
successor of x is the set xU{x). A set which contains 
the empty set and which contains the successor of each 
of its elements is called inductive. The set of 
natural numbers is then defined to be the intersection 
of all inductive sets. In particular, 1 is the succes-
sor of O UA, 1=U>), 2 is lU{l}=U,Ua etc. With this 
characterization, again the Peano axioms can be shown 
to be theorems of set theory. This method differs from 
the first essentially by picking a particular set of 
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the appropriate number of elements as a sort of 
representative. What is common to the two methods is 
that the sets used to represent the natural numbers do 
so in virtue of having the right number of elements. 
But even having the right number of elements is not 
required for a set to represent the natural numbers. 
For we can represent zero with the empty set and re-
present the successor operation such that the successor 
of a set x is {x}. In this case, the natural numbers 
are represented by the smallest inductive set under 
this successor operation. On this representation, the 
number 3, for example, is represented by {{{ <J> }}}. This 
characterization also gives the same formal properties 
to the set of natural numbers as the others do, in the 
sense that the Peano axioms are provably true of this 
set. Yet each natural number, on this char-
acterization, is a set of only one element (except for 
zero: but we could have started with something other 
than the empty set for zero). What makes this charac-
terization work is not the number of elements in each 
set, but the number of pairs of brackets used in con-
structing each set. 
Finally, in addition to the plethora of set-
theoretic characterizations of the natural numbers, 
there are non-set-theoretic characterizations. There 
is a geometric characterization as the collection of 
evenly spaced points on a half-line starting with the 
end-point as zero. The successor of a point x is the 
point closest to x which is not between 0 and x. The 
point of these examples is to raise the question of why 
any of them should be identified with the natural 
numbers. Whatever the natural numbers really are, it 
is clear that they have a formal similarity to all of 
the above characterizations, a formal similarity cap-
tured in the axioms of number theory. But whatever the 
natural numbers really are, it is also clear that they 
cannot be identical to each of the above char-
acterizations. What is not clear is why it should be 
the case that a natural number is a set of any kind. 
It is, however, plausible that number is a property 
of sets. And, in fact, this is what makes the above 
characterizations work: with respect to number, the 
various characterizations give certain sets the appro-
priate properties so that they have in common the for-
mal properties of the natural numbers. The first two 
characterizations associate natural numbers with sets 
or sets with the appropriate number of elements, the 
third with sets which have the right number of 
brackets, and the geometric characterization with 
points which are the appropriate number of units 
distant from the endpoint of a half-line. What I think 
this illustrates is not that any one of these charac-
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terizations is actually a definition of the natural 
numbers, rather that there are mathematical structures 
in various branches of mathematics, parts of which have 
the same properties with respect to number. In line 
with my characterization of mathematics, the Peano 
axioms define a kind of mathematical structure of which 
set theory and geometry can provide species or in-
stances. What this means is that these structures 
share number-theoretic properties, not that any one of 
them literally is the set of natural numbers. 
I think similar results apply to efforts to 
'reduce' any mathematical structure to another 
mathematical structure. There is a standard set-
theoretic definition of ordered pair (<a,h»={(a}, {a,B}}), 
but there are many other ways of achieving the same result 
(e^,.<a,b>={{b), {a,b}} or <a,b>=l(a), {b,^}}). What is important 
is>notthat any of these be identified with the notion of 
ordered pair, rather it is that all these charac-
terizations have the appropriate character of 'ordered-
pairness,1 that is, a structure of two objects which 
are related antisymmetrically. For similar reasons I 
would urge that group theory is, after all, not merely 
a part of set theory, though there are objects 
describable in set theory which have group-theoretic 
character. 
The result is that despite the apparent unification 
of much of mathematics into set theory, mathematics is 
best described as a rather decentralized area of in-
quiry in which the various branches of mathematics are 
in fact mathematical in their own right and not because 
they can be 'reduced1 to set theory. Each area 
describes its own object of study with rigor and esta-
blishes the derived properties of these objects. Thus, 
mathematics is not merely a collection of crystal 
palaces built on various set theories; in addition 
there are independent crystal palaces for number 
theory, group theory, and the rest. The various reduc-
tions have shown not that mathematics is set theory, 
but that there are objects describable in set theory 
which are formally similar to the objects described in 
other branches of mathematics. 
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THE DECORATION ILLUSTRATION-ART 
TRICHOTOMY 
RALPH ULLIS 
Georgia State University 
In the conflict between referentialist and non-
referentialist theories of art, perhaps the clearest 
extremes are the views of Clive Bell and Leo Tolstoy. 
Tolstoy makes the statement, "If only the spectators or 
auditors are infected by the feeling which the author 
has felt, it is art."[l] On the contrary, Bell, the 
twentieth-century champion of art-for-art's-sake, says, 
"The representative element in a work of art may or may 
not be harmful; always it is irrelevant. For to ap-
preciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing 
from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no 
familiarity with its emotions."(2 J For Bell, the 
usefulness of art for emotional purposes is as ir-
relevant as its usefulness for any other pragmatic 
purpose. The only emotion relevant to the experience 
of art, he says, is the "purely aesthetic appreciation" 
of a "significant form".[3] 
If referentialist theories tend to err on the side 
of confusing artistic merit with successful 
illustration (in Tolstoy's case, the illustration of 
emotions), non-referentialists are equally prone to 
confuse art with mere decoration. The purpose of this 
paper is to establish a ground for distinguishing ar-
tistic worth from both decoration and illustration. 
This distinction will also show that the relationship 
between the work of art and the spectator's emotions is 
different from any of the ones generally presupposed by 
both referentialists and non-referentialists. The 
possibility ignored by both camps is that a human being 
may have emotions that take the abstract rather than 
the concrete as their object, and that genuinely worthy 
art will cater only to those emotions pertaining to 
abstractions—such as, for example, love in the 
abstract, or hypothetical suffering, or the universal 
aspects of the human condition (including whatever 
general structures of human motivation may lead us to 
seek certain kinds of movement in a painting); genuine 
art will not cater to emotions that take the concrete 
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conditions or goals of the individual's own specific 
life situation as their object, such as whether he will 
eat dinner tonight. This does not imply that the ar-
tist may not refer to the objects of concrete emotions 
in order to produce his abstraction, but rather that 
the concrete emotion is not the thing of ultimate value 
in a work. Such a notion is implied by Suzanne 
Langer's theory of feeling in art,[4] and by Eugene 
Gendlin's further development of Langer's theory,15] in 
which Gendlin suggests that the object of feelings are 
not physical objects, but rather are 'felt meanings'. 
We shall explore this possibility along three 
lines: (I) the ontological problems raised by the 
decoration-illustration distinction in relation to the 
expression of feeling; (II) the implications of the dy-
namic nature of art; (III) the relation of form and 
content in the referentialism problem. 
I 
Two interrelated issues are at stake in the 
referentialism controversy. (1) Does the work of art 
refer beyond itself for its full range of meanings and 
values, or are its meanings and values to be found en-
tirely within its perceptual structure? (2) Is the 
meaning of a work of art to be assessed in terms of its 
emotional effect on the spectator, or is this effect 
irrelevant to its value as art? Bell's view would im-
ply that, if we define 'emotional' in terms of the 
moods and passions we experience in everyday or 1 real1 
life, then emotion is irrelevant to art. But if we al-
low that there may be one special class of emotions 
(the 'pure, aesthetic' emotions) that pertain only to 
the appreciation of art and not to everyday life, then 
the thesis that art has a kind of 'emotional' impact 
would not be entirely inconsistent with Bell's view (as 
William Bywater suggestsl6J), although such 'emotions' 
would have nothing to do with the ordinary emotions of 
life. In this respect, Bell's thinking is not al-
together dissimilar to Schopenhauer's. Schopenhauer 
distinguishes between 'beauty' and 'interest' in art: 
Art's true value, its beauty, he says, lies in its ex-
pression of a clear idea, whereas human emotions are 
merely brought in as a necessary evil in order to 
sustain the human spectator's interest.(7] For Bell, 
as for Schopenhauer, the role of emotion in literature 
is misleading because of the extent to which literature 
must utilize extra-aesthetic factors in order to 
sustain the reader's interest. That literature must 
use human emotions to produce its spectacle does not 
imply that the emotions are essential or even relevant 
to the artistic merit of the work. 
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In attempting to clarify whether, to what extent, 
and in what respects art has as its purpose the 
'expression of emotion', it will be best not to ignore 
certain ontological problems. Many of these have been 
well summarized by John Hospers in the following 
questions |8|: (1) Whose emotions are to be conveyed? 
The artist's? If so, how should he select which 
emotions of his to convey? Does he convey the emotions 
he feels while actually writing the work? Of what in-
terest are these to the spectator? (2) What does the 
word 'express' means in the thesis that art expresses 
emotion. If it means, as Tolstoy suggests, that the 
spectator must feel what the artist himself has felt, 
the problem arises as to how a listener can appreciate 
the melancholy of a Mozart Andante without himself 
feeling melancholy while he appreciates it. But if 
•expression' means that the spectator simply under-
stands and acknowledges what the artist has felt, then 
a mere expository account of the artist's feelings 
would suffice—in which case the grumbling of a chronic 
grouch should also qualify as art. 
If Tolstoy's view is that art expresses the 
artist's own emotions, we might also ask him a third 
question. There appears to be such a phenomenon as 
•self-indulgence' in writers and actors who use such 
techniques as 'cheap pathos' to sweep the audience 
along in a torrent of irrelevant or unmotivated 
emotion. Critics generally frown upon such 'self-
indulgence', apparently with some justification. 
Though a technically-gifted artist may succeed in in-
ducing his audience to 'appreciate' a self-indulgent 
display, may it not be that the appreciation they ex-
perience is more an appreciation of the artist's gift 
of illustration (i.e., the illustration of emotions) 
than of his accomplishment as an artist in the more 
restricted sense of 'true art' as opposed to mere il-
lustration or mere decoration? The thesis that art 
must be distinguished from mere decoration and from 
mere illustration, of course, does not imply that il-
lustration and decoration cannot attain to the status 
of art; it implies rather that the features that deter-
mine whether they qualify as art are different from the 
features that qualify them as good decoration or good 
illustration. 
Referentialism sometimes seems to impy that the ul-
timate purpose of art is to communicate emotions which 
take the phenomena of the individual's own life as 
their object. This would entail the absurd conclusion 
that the speeches of a psychotherapy patient or the 
temper tantrums of a child should be classified as art. 
But the non-referentialists ignore the equally impor-
tant point that the emotions of art are based upon the 
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emotions of life and that art must therefore refer to 
these for its ultimate value and meaning. The truth 
must certainly lie somewhere between these extremes. 
Good art, whatever else it may accomplish, must at 
least engender feelings which abstract from the par-
ticular emotions of life. These feelings are no diff-
erent from the emotions of life except that they take 
the abstract rather than the concrete as their 
object.[9] To move an audience into this realm of 
emotional abstractions, however, art must refer beyond 
itself to the full range of subjective moods and value-
feelings. The danger that referentialists like Tolstoy 
flirt with—the danger of failing to distinguish con-
crete from abstract emotional content—can therefore be 
avoided within a modified referentialism, attenuated 
with the qualification that only abstract or univer-
salizable emotions are to be 'expressed1. (This, of 
course, does not imply that the characters in a novel 
cannot feel concrete emotions, or even that the reader 
cannot empathize with them, but only that this empathy 
is not the ultimate goal of a good novel.) 
This thesis would provide a convenient answer to 
Hospers' question about whose emotions are supposed to 
be expressed. Neither the specific emotions that the 
artist feels in his everyday life nor those the spec-
tator ordinarily feels should be elicited. (What point 
would there be in eliciting emotions someone ordinarily 
feels anyway?) Rather, emotions whose objects exist no 
more for one person than for another—emotions with 
abstract, universalizable objects—are the central 
point of interest. Of course, particular, tangible ob-
jects must be used as part of the artist's tool kit in 
eliciting these emotions, but the particular object by 
itself is not the thing toward which the emotions are 
directed; it merely represents a more general constel-
lation of values and truths which is the true excitor 
of the aesthetic emotions. 
Art is more concerned with evoking emotion than 
with depicting it. To depict in a painting the emotion 
of a mother crying because her son has died is 
illustration; to paint the same subject in such a way 
as to evoke in the viewer a mood of much broader scope, 
and of a different kind, is art. This different kind 
of emotion, however, can by no means be independent of 
the emotions we experience in relation to 'real life.' 
Joshua Reynolds seems to have reasoned similarly when 
he advised the aspiring artist to paint the general 
idea rather than the particular thing, but to paint the 
general as found in the particular.110] At this point, 
however, Reynolds tends to blur the distinction between 
depicting and evoking. The depiction of emotion can be 
one of the elements used in the evocation of emotion. 
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Whether an artist depicts the general or the particular 
should be of little consequence, as long as the 
response he evokes in the viewer is a general one. 
Probably for this reason, Reynolds fails to see 
Hogarth's greatness, criticizing him for choosing "low 
subjects" for his paintings.|11] Certainly, no artist 
can literally put abstractions on canvas, any more than 
an algebraic equation can be played on the violin. But 
if art is to evoke emotion, rather than merely depict-
ing or illustrating it, then the emotional response 
which is art's aim must be in some sense a more ab-
stract kind of emotion than the ones we ordinarily ex-
perience in life; its object, at least, must be of a 
more general nature than the simple tangibles relevant 
to the usual, everyday emotional responses and desires. 
The treatment of the subject is the object of the aes-
thetic emotion, not simply the subject in itself. This 
treatment reveals the abstracting vision that makes its 
emotional impact upon the viewer. However, these ab-
stract emotions are as dependent on concrete ones as 
any abstraction is on its concrete exemplars. This 
does not mean that abstract emotions do not themselves 
exist concretely, but simply that they would not exist 
were it not for the more concretely directed ones from 
which they abstract. 
At the same time that art must be distinguished 
from mere illustration on the one hand, it must also be 
distinguished from mere decoration or entertainment on 
the other. Everything in the human environment evokes 
some emotion or other—even if only confusion or 
boredom—and therefore functions as good, bad or in-
different decoration. If we straighten a picture 
frame, we contribute to the decorative quality of the 
environment by changing the emotion it evokes from one 
of chaos to one of harmony. The artist's aim in work-
ing his material is not so much to cause it to evoke 
emotion (for this it already does), but to change the 
emotion it evokes to one that he considers worthwhile. 
If the finished product yields only a concrete feeling 
of pleasure which like a shot of morphine refers to 
nothing beyond the immediate enjoyment of the 
sensation, it is decoration but not yet art. If on the 
other hand it merely refers to something beyond itself 
(for example, to some concrete emotion that the artist 
has felt) but evokes no abstract emotion in the 
spectator, then it in effect only calls attention to a 
real-life phenomenon to which the spectator could have 
reacted without the artist's help; it is therefore mere 
illustration and not art. A work of art that is more 
than decoration and also more than illustration must 
both refer beyond itself to an abstraction not readily 
apparent in real life and also evoke in the spectator 
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an abstract emotional response which he would not or-
dinarily make to the concrete phenomena of life. The 
essential distinguishing feature of art by contrast to 
both illustration and decoration is that the object of 
the emotion it evokes is an abstraction. Art is not 
unique in addressing these abstractions (so does 
philosophy, for example) but it is unique in aiming to 
produce a directly emotional involvement with them. 
The second part of this paper will explore the role 
of both concrete and abstract emotional values in 
motivating the aesthetic response to (a) dynamic art 
forms and (b) static art forms. We shall find that, 
the more genuinely artistic a work is by contrast to 
mere decoration and mere illustration, the more dynamic 
it is; therefore, no art form is truly 'static.' The 
third part of the paper will show that form as well as 
content can excite the emotions and that Bell's 
distinction between form and content, upon which his 
idea of 'significant form' depends, is artificial. 
Almost any 'form' can become a content for some higher-
order form, and almost any content can be interpreted 
as a form arising from the relationship of some more 
basic contents. In order to have significant form, a 
work of art must first have significant content in the 
sense of an emotional meaning, though this meaning has 
the abstract rather than the concrete as its object. 
II 
In assessing the role of human value and emotion in 
art, it is helpful to clarify two distinctions, one of 
which turns out to be a pseudo-distinction. First (and 
this is the pseudo-distinction), dynamic art—art that 
must structure itself in time—versus static art, which 
need not be so concerned with time. Secondly, concrete 
emotional values—those that appeal to issues that af-
fect the individual per se (such as whether he will eat 
dinner tonight)—versus abstract emotions, which posit 
more generalized or universalized values. All aes-
thetic value, however, whether abstract or concrete, 
implies subjective value to a possible spectator. 
(Whether it is limited to such subjective value alone 
is another question, but it certainly implies at least 
some subjective value to a possible spectator.) 
Dynamic art—art that unfolds sequentially through 
time—must have a plot structure or direction toward 
which the spectator tends to want the story or com-
position to move. In the case of fiction, for example, 
something must be at stake in the outcome of the plot. 
In order to interest the spectator in the outcome, the 
writer must motivate him to accept the issues at stake 
as important, at least within the context of the story. 
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Action in drama, for example, must be 'motivated' in 
order to be effective. Unmotivated action makes no 
sense and only distracts from the meaning of the play 
as experienced. For an action to be 'motivated', the 
playwright must first have laid some groundwork for 
this motivation by setting the action in a context 
where the viewer has posited some values or ends toward 
which he wants the action to go, toward which he feels 
it 'should' go. If the viewer is not concerned with 
whether boy will get girl, then all actions in the play 
will appear unmotivated and therefore uninteresting. 
Dynamic arts must structure themselves in terms of ends 
experienced as emotionally charged with value. Drama, 
fiction, music and narrative poetry are obvious exam-
ples of such arts because they all elapse through time 
and therefore must set up a motivational structure to 
sustain the spectator's interest. 
That dynamic arts involve human feeling does not 
imply that these feelings must be concrete. The viewer 
does not need to be in love with the heroine in order 
to want the hero to win her affection. He accepts this 
value by fiat in order to appreciate the story. He 
could as well decide that the heroine is a worthless 
creature undeserving of the role the playwright has 
given her. In this case, however, the playwright may 
be at fault for demanding that the viewer accept ab-
stract emotional values which contradict real values he 
already possesses. Part of the writer's job is to 
avoid this problem by making the viewer feel that the 
heroine is a worthwhile character. To this extent, the 
play must appeal to concrete emotions the viewer has 
brought with him from real life. But beyond this 
point, the good writer can make us posit values which 
we do not uphold in real life: He can make us want to 
see Tristan and Isolde united although in real life 
their plight does not concern us in the least. A com-
poser can make us want to hear tensions resolved to the 
tonic note although such resolution has no bearing on 
real life. He could not do so, however, without making 
use of what he knows about real human emotions in order 
to motivate us. No one would accuse Tchaikovsky of 
corrupting the purity of music by using the real 
emotions of sadness and anger in his Sixth Symphony. 
Quite the contrary, it would lose its entire meaning 
and interest if these emotions were deleted. Its 
structure would be unmotivated at every point. With 
some music, such as that of Bach, it is more difficult 
to apply such simple emotional labels as 'sadness' and 
'anger'; we should remember, however, that even Bach 
spoke of a doctrine of 'affects' in music. 
Clive Bell's argument against art as evoking mun-
dane or everday human emotion clearly does not apply to 
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those dynamic works of art which involve abstract 
emotional direction. The paradox that we 'enjoy' 
tragedy, though it also makes us suffer, is comprehen-
sible only because the emotion we experience is ab-
stract rather than concrete; we experience generalized 
or hypothetical suffering.[12] But however abstract 
this suffering may be, to remove the humanly-defined 
values and goal orientations would be to render the 
story uninteresting and to destroy the cathartic 
effect. In the case of such dynamic art forms as drama 
and fiction, the meaning of the aesthetic experience 
obviously requires that the spectator have defined or 
posited something beyond the mere form of the work of 
art as valuable or valued. 
How does Bell's argument apply to dynamic arts that 
involve concrete values? Perhaps we should not regard 
anything as art whose value would rest solely on con-
crete human values. Pornography, for example, trades 
almost exclusively on the unsatisfied sexual desire of 
the reader. Take away the sexual desire and he loses 
interest as rapidly as the sated stomach loses interest 
in food. In fact, a purely pornographic novel relates 
to the reader's sexual desire in very much the same way 
that an attractive restaurant menu relates to his 
hunger. In either case, if the supposed aesthetic 
value of the object depends solely on the corresponding 
concrete desire, this 'value' disappears as soon as the 
desire is sated. Bell's point remains valid in these 
cases at least to this extent: If we admire a menu 
only before we have eaten, we admire only its content, 
which appeals to specific concrete desires. The more 
clearly the menu depicts this content, the better it 
serves as illustration, as opposed to art. But if we 
admire the menu after we have eaten, something other 
than its concrete emotional content must appeal to u s — 
namely (Bell would say) its form. Illustration can be 
art, but it need not be. 
But at this point we must also bear in mind an im-
portant difference between the pornographic novel and 
the menu. The novel is a dynamic art form which must 
have a plot to sustain our interest and therefore must 
have abstract human emotion to interest us once our 
concrete emotion (such as sexual desire) has become 
irrelevant. The plot of a novel can have no form 
without a humanly-defined value structure. That is why 
most novels have human beings in them. Thus, for a dy-
namic art to have what Bell calls 'significant form', 
It must also have significant content in terms of 
(abstract) emotional values to which human readers or 
listeners can relate. Dynamic art defines its form in 
terms of such emotional content and must do so in order 
to sustain the spectator's interest. Even the most 
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avid lover of art-for-art's-sake would lose interest in 
a novel with no characters or plot, just as the most 
avid sportsman would lose interest in a game with no 
goal-oriented structure. In fact, there can be no game 
without some such structure, any more than there can be 
a novel without humanly defined values. 
But what about the seemingly 'static' art forms such as visual art and non-narrative poetry? Perhaps Bell's theory is true for them? 
We must ask first of all whether visual art and 
non-narrative poetry really are static or whether the 
movement they imply presupposes or creates a 
motivational directedness in the viewer which is essen-
tial to his grasping the meaning of the work. For 
example, crossing lines in a picture frequently imply 
•blocked' motion. The viewer in his kinaesthetic 
orientation takes up the direction of a line as soon as 
his eye is compelled to trace its path. He then per-
ceives the interruption of his eye movement as thwart-
ing this direction. A picture with many crossed lines 
usually creates tension for this reason. Straight 
lines enhance this effect still further because they 
impel the eye more definitely in one direction than 
does a curved line. The eye also tends to move from 
the thick end of a line to the thin end. Through such 
techniques the artist gives his pictures an 'impact', 
which we experience by contrast to dime store pictures 
which are almost completely static and therefore 'fall 
flat'. Even in the case of the 'static' art forms, the 
more artful examples tend to be dynamic. A vivid 
painting of a horse, says Maurice Merleau-Ponty, may 
show one foot in one instant of time and another foot 
in another instant, so that the effect of motion is 
achieved.[13J Even an effective still-life impels the 
eye to move this way or that, generating an 
emotionally-meaningful pattern. There is no truly 
static art. But, as in the case of the abstract 
'suffering' in tragedy, the tension we feel in viewing 
a painting is abstract and does not need to appeal to 
the viewer's private emotions so much for its effect 
(which is not to say that the presence of such 
emotions, or some previous acquaintance with them, may 
not enhance the effect). 
It is important to note that in the example of ten-
sion in a painting it is the 'form' of the painting 
rather than its content that evokes an emotional 
reaction. In the examples Bell uses, such as 
crucifixion scenes, we are led to believe that it is 
always the subject matter depicted in the scene that 
evokes emotions other than the 'purely aesthetic' 
emotion; Bell would have us assume that the form has 
nothing to do with ordinary or mundane emotions. By 
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failing to consider the relationship between abstract 
and concrete emotional values, Bell ignores the diff-
erences between evoking emotion and merely depicting 
it. He therefore concludes, erroneously, that to ap-
peal to the everyday emotions in any way whatever is 
irrelevant to the purpose of art. 
I l l 
If a story or symphony is to be 'beautiful', it 
must, as Bell suggests, have a good form or structure. 
No novel could be beautiful if its tensions were 
resolved ex nihilo or if the resolution of all 
questions ~Tn the story were reached in the first chap-
ter and all the rest served as denouement. But since 
at the root of the formal structure of a novel or a 
symphony are human moods and passions, form and content 
cannot so clearly be distinguished for a comparison. 
The meanings of the words 'content' and 'form' have 
been so hotly disputed in aesthetics for so long that 
they might best be avoided, except that they are in-
dispensable in the context of the referentialism 
dispute. Given this context, it is convenient to use 
them in their essential referentialist sense, 
especially since Bell himself, the arch-anti-
referentialist, seems to do so. By 'content' we mean, 
roughly, the elements of a work of art which correspond 
to the specific emotions evoked (for example, 
revolutionary activity in a play corresponds to 
revolutionary fervor in the audience); by 'form' we 
mean the structural pattern into which the artist 
weaves the content. It will soon become evident that 
forms can also be used as contents for higher-order 
forms, and contents are frequently built up from lower-
order forms. Also, form itself can be one of the con-
tents of a work of art if it evokes the 'purely aes-
thetic emotion' Bell talks about (although we shall 
show that form can never be the only content in a work 
of true art, as opposed to a work of decoration). In 
spite of these limitations, the form/content distinc-
tion remains a usable one if we remember that the terms 
have meaning only in relation to each other, and that 
the form of a work may also function as part of its 
content. 
Non-referentialists like Bell seem to suppose that 
a theory of art which casts human emotions in the cen-
tral role will mean that the painting of a crucifixion 
scene, for example, will derive its artistic worth 
solely or primarily from the emotions the viewer feels 
regarding the subject matter depicted in the 
representation. But this oversimplified view of the 
emotions forgets that they can be aroused by the form 
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of a painting—its texture, color composition, etc. It 
does not follow, however, that the mood associated with 
the form of a work can be independent of its content. 
Whether or not a realistic or semi-realistic scene is 
depicted will influence how the viewer sees the form: 
That a shadow should be almost as clear, as distinct, 
and as sharply outlined as the object of which it is 
the shadow means that the form of the painting con-
tributes to the meaning of 'bright light', and the en-
tire painting will then be viewed in terms of a light 
source; whereas if this same color composition could be 
viewed without being at all thought of as a realistic 
or semi-realistic representation of anything, but 
merely qua color composition (as Bell urges), the 
meaning of its form as perceived would be wholly diff-
erent (it would lose the character of three-
dimensionality; 'things' in the painting would no 
longer have the meaning of a sub-form as 
distinguishable from the sub-form constituted by the 
lighting-and-shading effects, etc.). Again, if the 
left sides of objects are bright, and the right sides 
are dull or dark, the contribution of this effect to 
the form of the painting will be greater than and diff-
erent from the contribution that would be made if half 
the objects were brighter on the left, the other half 
brighter on the right. In these cases, the form of the 
painting as a phenomenon (i.e., as seen by a viewer) is 
different according to whether it is viewed as three-
dimensional or two, whether light is viewed as direc-
tional or as a mere flood of light: in short, whether 
the painting is viewed as the representation of some 
possible scene or occurrence. To isolate that which is 
depicted from the way in which it is depicted, equating 
the former with content and the latter with form, is 
oversimplified and artificial. On the other hand, it 
is true to say that form determines mood, if we bear in 
mind that content (including the subject matter 
depicted, to the extent that it is relevant to 
eliciting the appropriate emotions) contributes to the 
overall meaning of a given form. 
Not only whether realistic objects are depicted af-
fects the form of a painting, but even what kinds of 
objects are depicted affects it. A rich carpet can be 
made to harmonize with washed out walls in a painting 
of a room; but if grass is painted with this same rich 
quality, while trees in the same scene are of a washed 
out color, something different happens to the form of 
the painting: A new relationship between and among 
elements of the composition arises—a relationship 
which has the meaning 'eeriness' or 'strangeness', 
resulting from the 'unnatural' color combination. Or 
again, if an object of special emotional importance, 
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such as a person, is placed at the center of 
attention—or perhaps an object which does not quite 
'belong', such as a modern businessman in a Medieval 
setting—, then the figure-ground effect will be shar-
per than usual. An object of special interest warps 
the 'hodological space' of the entire picture. In 
general, 'formal' relationships between and among 
emotionally-charged 'content' elements can be used to 
produce forms which are more emotionally significant 
(on the abstract level) than the same painting might 
have been if the artist had deprived himself of the use 
of the emotionally-charged elements. To deprive him-
self of the potential for these kinds of relationships 
would be like depriving his palette of the color red. 
The meaning of El Greco's Toledo, for example, would be 
quite different—and obviously less significant—if it 
were done in gay yellows rather than in somber grays 
and browns. 
The relativity of form and content is still more 
remarkable in the case of music. If we regard the form 
of a musical composition as its overall structure, such 
as sonata or fugue, then the individual parts—the 
themes and the development sections—become the 
contents. But if we regard a melody as a form, the 
chord progressions and phrases that make up the melody 
become contents. If we regard a chord progression as a 
form, the chords become contents. But if we regard a 
single note as a content, then a single chord can be a 
form. Any element, it would appear, can be either a 
content or a form. 
Suppose we regard a single note as a content. The 
simplest possible relationships among these content 
elements would constitute what we might call 'lower-
order forms': harmonies, rhythms and melodic lines. 
These simple, lower-order forms are already capable of 
embodying rudimentary moods. The mood of a minor chord 
can be distinguished according to emotional tone from 
the mood of a major chord. A major chord with a major 
seventh added produces still another mood. The wist-
fulness of Debussy's Reverie distinguishes itself from 
the more heavy melancholy of a similar passage from 
Tchaikovsky's Fifth Symphony partly because Debussy 
frequently uses major-seventh chords, whereas 
Tchaikovsky seldom does. A slightly higher-order form 
emerges if we string together two or more chords, form-
ing a chord progression. The progression from a C 
major-seventh chord to a B-flat major-seventh retains 
the general emotional meaning of the major seventh but 
deepens the meaning and adds new flavors or dimensions: 
for example, among other qualities of this progression, 
a notable one is the feeling of a deeper, more in-
trospective moodiness. A good example of its ap-
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plication occurs in the scene from Claude Lelouche's 
film Live for Life, in which the main character, an ol-
der man, goes to a party where young people are dancing 
and impressing each other with fashionable behaviors. 
As the protagonist sits and watches, thinking of the 
absurdity of such expressions of vanity, etc., his mood 
is at an opposite pole from theirs. To show how the 
scene appears from the perspective of the protagonist's 
mood, Lelouche deletes the sound from the scene, al-
lowing only Francis Lai's wistful background music to 
be heard. The music captures the protagonist's mood 
primarily through the use of the chord progression from 
C major-seventh to B-flat major-seventh. 
In this same music, however, Lai wishes not only to 
capture a mood, but to hint at an underlying passion—a 
value-laden and value-directed feeling—for the mood of 
the character stems from something he is learning about 
value in life during the course of the film. Lai em-
bellishes his chord progression with two devices: A 
passing chord—B seventh—is inserted between the C 
major-seventh and the B-flat major-seventh to increase 
the feeling of directionality, of longing for 
resolution (a seventh chord so naturally functions as a 
'leading-tone' chord that it is normally expected to do 
so); and this feeling is increased still further by 
suspending a fourth in the B-seventh chord (for a 
suspension does just what its name implies—creates a 
suspense or tension that longs for resolution). 
This example illustrates several features of 
content-form relations in music: (1) The lowest-order 
forms embody moods. (2) Slightly higher-order forms, 
such as the one just discussed, intensify moods, fur-
ther specify them, focus them more sharply, and begin 
to put them into context of a value-directed sequence 
of mood-shades, thus bringing the dimension of passion 
into play. (3) As each lower-order form becomes the 
content for a higher-order form, the dependence of the 
very content of the mood itself upon its context in the 
higher-order form becomes increasingly important. (4) 
In music, it would appear as a general rule of thumb 
that form is to content as passion is to mood, if by 
content we mean a lower order form which becomes a con-
tent for higher order forms. 
But if we pursue this line a little further, we see 
that this apparent general rule is an oversimplifi-
cation. Features (2) and (3) above already suggest 
that it is artificial to think of a mood outside of its 
context, or at least that the same musical denotation 
in one context will connote a different mood from the 
same denotation in a different context. Furthermore, 
every passion is also a mood, in the sense that it has 
a specifiable affective tone as well as a value-
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direction. So when several elements (whether moods or 
passions) interrelate formally so as to produce a 
larger whole, this larger whole necessarily embodies a 
more comprehensive mood, though it does not necessarily 
embody any more comprehensive passion. This can be 
seen clearly at the end of a musical composition. 
Ordinarily, tensions are somewhat resolved at the end 
of a piece, in the sense of a Gestalt closure. In 
fact, in a composition experienced as 'good', the 
structure of the composition is usually such that the 
taste which lingers after the last note is sounded is 
not merely the taste of that last note, but rather a 
feeling for the meaning of the piece as a whole. To 
the extent that there are still outstanding passions 
that would tend to motivate some further direction 
beyond the end of the composition, we usually regard 
this as a fault in the structure of the composition. 
Beethoven, for example, often experimented with many 
different endings for the same symphony. Too long or 
too heavy a coda would cause the meaning of the coda, 
rather than that of the whole symphony, to linger; too 
short a coda would leave outstanding passions 
unresolved. From these observations, we can deduce 
that although passions are indispensable requisites for 
establishing the overall mood of a whole composition, 
it is this overall mood itself which is of principal 
importance in the composer's purpose. We would have 
been misled, then, had we assumed that every mood is as 
simple and as concrete as are those which usually occur 
to us as common or mundane examples of them. In fact, 
complex moods usually do not occur to us as examples 
precisely because only art can readily express them. 
Not only does the formal structure of a composition 
depend on content, but to a great extent the content 
dictates and defines the form. The meaning of the form 
as experienced by the listener is built up step-by-step 
as each form becomes content for a higher-order form. 
Formal elegance can only result from an overall inter-
relation of musical progressions that remains true to 
the emotional content of its elements. The supposed 
distinction between form and content is really only a 
distinction between lower- and higher-order forms. 
Thus, to say with Bell that a work of art has 
'signnificant form' is also to presuppose that it has 
significant content. What makes this content sig-
nificant is that it has a specific kind of emotional 
meaning—a meaning which refers to emotionally meaning-
ful abstractions rather than to emotionally-meaningful 
particulars. These abstractions are equally meaningful 
for everyone, since they transcend the particular 
desires, goals and conditions of the individual's own 
egocentric life situation. The values relevant to art, 
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therefore, are not the values which are derivative from 
specific drives, needs or wants, either of the artist 
or the spectator: They are not self-seeking values. 
They make their appeal on a higher emotional level, the 
level on which all individuals share in one universal 
condition and all perceptual objects share in universal 
significances as defined by the reactions of the human 
spectator. Only when art moves in this realm of ab-
stractions does it simultaneously escape the ever-
dayness of mere illustration of concrete emotions (as 
in the case of pornography and didacticism), and the 
scantly significant 'prettiness' of mere decoration, 
which is too static to motivate our sustained interest. 
(Again, however, decoration and illustration can attain 
to the status-of true art, but only if they transcend 
their respective concrete functions.) 
In conclusion, then, the role that human emotions 
play in the appreciation of art is indispensable, for 
without emotion art would lose its dramatic structre 
and its dynamic impact. Art, by contrast to mere 
illustration, is concerned with abstract rather than 
concrete emotions. However, the abstract emotions of 
art depend upon the concrete emotions of life for their 
comprehension. We must understand in a general way the 
range of emotions if art is to speak to us. Which' 
emotions we have felt may be less important than that 
we have felt some emotions or other and are able to ab-
stract from them. The essential point is that we be 
capable of feeling emotions that do not relate directly 
to the satisfaction of our own private needs and wants. 
Without such emotions, art would have neither meaning 
nor value. We must therefore grant to the referen-
tialists that art must refer beyond itself—to the 
human emotional predicament in general—in order to 
have meaning. On the other hand, the form of art is 
such that the emotions involved become abstractions and 
uniVersals. Art contributes by means of its form to a 
content that inherently points beyond itself, precisely 
by referring to emotions having the abstract as their 
object rather than concrete conditions of interest to 
the artist orv to the spectator as such. 
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